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PUNISHMENT, FORGIVENESS, AND THE
PROXY PROBLEM
DANIEL N. ROBINSON*
I.
The concept and the issue of punishment both raise philo-
sophical questions that resist straightforward analysis. Factors at
once personal, contextual, and circumstantial generate vexing
concerns as to whether an action otherwise rightly punished
under one set of conditions warrants punishment under this set
of conditions; or in the case of this actor; or in light of the time
and place at which this action occurred. Matters become no
more tractable by invoking versions of legal positivism. To
exhaust the conditions of punishment merely by referring to vio-
lations of law simply defers fundamental questions regarding the
sense in which "consequences," "violating," and "law" are to be
understood. "Did Oedipus murder his father?" Note that the
burden of the question is not adequately borne by joining the
fact that Laius was the biological father of Oedipus to the fact
that, on the fateful day, Oedipus struck a mortal blow against
him. If there were a special punishment reserved to those guilty
of parricide, it is not at all clear that Oedipus would be justly
found guilty. Similarly, in light of the moral law that condemns
an incestuous relationship between mother and son, it is clear
that neither Oedipus nor Jocasta was guilty, for neither knew the
actual familial relationship obtaining between them.
Staying with this famous tragedy, it may be asked how the
matter of punishment should be understood, given that Odeipus
and, later, Oedipus and Jocasta acted as they did. More gener-
ally, what principles should determine punishments for various
offenses? It is, of course, a veritable fixture within the rule of law
that punishment must fit the offense that warrants it. Nonethe-
less, there is no calculus or modulus of "fitness" in any objective
mathematical sense of proportionality. Moreover, the sense in
which the offense "warrants" punishment is typically left to what
is no more than conventional or allegedly intuitive
understandings.
* Adjunct Professor, Columbia. Philosophy Faculty, Oxford. Distin-
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The earliest effort to reduce such problems to an objective
system was Jeremy Bentham's. In Chapter VII of his Principles of
Morals and Legislation, he distills that the very function of govern-
ment "is to promote the happiness of the society, by punishing
and rewarding."1 If the task of government is maximizing plea-
sure, in large measure by reducing pain and suffering, then pun-
ishable offenses are those that produce the latter. Thus, the
warrant for punishment is wrongfully causing pain to others or
significantly reducing their innocent pleasures.
Bentham then sets forth what he takes to be the four princi-
pal objectives of punishment-prevention, attenuation, motivation,
and econom---and thirteen rules for its application.2 Punishment
is designed to prevent mischief. If it cannot be prevented, it can
be lessened by inducing the perpetrator to commit the least mis-
chievous action compatible with his own purposes.' Through
this same motivating power of punishment, the perpetrator
becomes rather more disposed to restrain himself even in the
commission of offenses.4 Finally, of all the ways punishment may
be effective, the least costly is to be preferred.5
It is instructive to consider briefly several of the axioms Ben-
tham offers as a way into the thickets of a rule of law that seeks to
put punishment on a rational foundation. To wit:
1. The effects of punishment must outweigh whatever
profit is in the offense. 6
2. The greater the mischief of the offense, the greater the
expense it may be worth to punish it.7
3. The same amount of punishment is reserved for the
same offenses, more or less indifferent to the identity of
the offender, except insofar as specific persons differ in their
sensibilities, dispositions, and circumstances.8
4. The deterrent power of punishment is established not
only by its severity but by its predictability, and the two
in combination must reach the threshold of efficacy.
1. JEREMY BENTHAM, A FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT AND AN INTRODUCTION
TO THE PRINCIPLES AND MORALS AND LEGISLATION 189 (Wilfred Harrison ed.,
Basil Blackwood & Mott, Ltd. 1948) (1823).
2. Id. at 289-98.
3. Id. at 289.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 290.
7. Id. at 292.
8. Id. at 293.
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Thus, as the probability of punishment is the less, so its severity
must be the greater.9
5. With the habitual offender, the punishment must be
much greater; so much so as to "outweigh the profit not
only of the individual offence, but of such other like offences as
are likely to have been committed with impunity by the same
offender."10
As reasonable as these five precepts appear to be on first
reading, closer examination discloses whole realms of what is dis-
putable and even hopelessly conjectural. Consider the commit-
ted terrorist whose actions must satisfy deeply held religious
convictions. What punishment "outweighs" the profit secured by
the offense? The precepts are also regularly violated under the
banner of law. The State offers to drop charges against a known
criminal, in return for which testimony is obtained that incrimi-
nates others. For all practical purposes, a benefit has followed a
wrong-doing. Indeed, until relatively recent times, courts would
not deny inheritance to a beneficiary who had murdered the
testator!
Bentham's second precept, designed to set the costs of pun-
ishment according to the degree of mischief, raises two questions
at the start: Mischief to whom, and measured by what means? On utili-
tarian grounds, what constitutes the mischief in an action is the
pain it causes or the pleasure it diminishes or prevents. Mischief,
in this sense, is inextricably tied to states whose intensity must be
particularized at the level of the specific victim. Indeed, Ben-
tham's third precept acknowledges just such individuated attrib-
utes found within the specific offender. As for the fourth
precept, which proportions the severity of punishment to the
improbability of apprehending the offender, it is clear that the
scheme leads to counterintuitive results. It would call for the
periodic recalibrating of punishments just in case refinements in
policing and forensics yield higher probabilities of apprehen-
sion. The fifth precept, based on some sort of guess as to how
many undetected offenses a recidivist may have committed,
would appear to set no limit whatever on the severity of punish-
ment administered, for example, to persons addicted to narcotics
or to compulsive forms of criminal but not especially destructive
behavior.
The point of this brief rehearsal of early utilitarian attempts
to base punishment on seemingly objective grounds is to under-
score their futility. At work is an attempt to solve conceptual
9. Id. at 294.
10. Id. at 294-95.
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problems by treating them as if they were essentially technical.
In the matter of punishment, the conceptual difficulties do not
arise first in connection with the nature of offenses or the need
to address them proportionally. Rather, the foundational issue is
that of identifying and justifying punitive authority. It is only after
there is understanding of the nature of the rights and the duties
to punish that it becomes clearer as to what the aims and nature
of punishment should be. By way of conceptual parity, it also
becomes clearer as to the sources and the justification of
forgiveness.
II.
Prior to the reforms of Solon, grievances were addressed by
way of the lex talionis which was the grounding of phratric jus-
tice." One who injures the clan or phratry exposes his own com-
munity to retaliation. The retaliation could be averted through
compensatory payments.2 Otherwise, acts of revenge were
launched and were utterly indifferent to questions of individual
guilt. The offense could be avenged by targeting any member of
the offending clan, for it is in the very nature of phratric societies
that one's personal identity is just one's phratric identity.' 3
Only after the rise of the polis is there the development of a
form of statutory law that establishes a new aggrieved or victim-
class variously known as the Crown, the People, the State, or Soci-
ety. Now the offender takes on the burden of debt of some sort
to be repaid through punishment, after which the debt is, as it
were, reset to zero. Under such arrangements and understand-
ings, a new and still complex issue arises; viz., that of the state
authority as proxy. In some sense needing to be clarified and
then justified, punitive authority is invested in a central executive
with the power to impose penalties to redress grievances typically
endured by specific persons. In the paradigmatic instance, Bill
kills Tom. Tom's three dependent children are now fatherless,
and Tom's spouse has lost forever a beloved mate. The State
11. It is worth noting that the reforms of Solon and Draco in this connec-
tion gave to the Hellenic world a form of law respecting the individuated nature
of moral fault. Although blame and punishment were not focused on the
actual perpetrator, the ancient law continued to include among the injured and
offended the widest range of family relations. See DANIEL N. ROBINSON, WILD
BEASTS & IDLE HuMOuRS: THE INSANITY DEFENSE FROM ANTiQUITY TO THE PRE-
SENT 1-47 (1996).
12. See DOUGLAS M. MACDOWELL, ASPECTS OF GREEK AND ROMAN LiFE 110
(H.H. Scullard ed., 1978).
13. See ROBINSON, supra note 11, at 1-47; see also MACDOWELL, supra note
12, at 110.
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(the Crown, the People, etc.) convicts Bill and carries out the
imposed death penalty. Thus having suffered the maximum pen-
alty, Bill has paid his debt to society.
There seems to be something wrong with this picture.
Though Tom's wife and children are members of society and are
in some sense beneficiaries of this "payment," it is obvious that
their loss is incalculably greater than that suffered by anyone
else-by everyone else-as a result of the crime. If it were plausi-
ble to approach such losses in a quantitative way, it would be rele-
vant to recognize that the offense cost one life mortally, but also
caused enduring pain and suffering to four other lives. The
assailant's lost life simply cannot be made proportional to the
cost of his offense. How, indeed, is his execution even compensa-
tory? Would it not be fairer to allow the family to execute Bill,
perhaps torturing him before delivering the lethal blow or injec-
tion? Though death is the final penalty, there are certainly addi-
tions to death that would greatly increase the total package.
Would it not be more punitive and proportional to round up
some number of Bill's relatives thereupon executing them in
Bill's presence, and including this in the overall calculation of
just compensation? To ask a comparably macabre question, is
not rape the right ("proportional") punishment for a rapist?
The last word on just what it is that constitutes an "offense"
is likely to remain elusive. It has been suggested that, at the most
general level, an action becomes an offense in virtue of it consti-
tuting disrespect for the person. Punishment then serves as a
form of rectification.14 The notion here is that each person
embodies a measure of moral worth and dignity that others have
a duty to respect. Crimes against the person are, on this account,
finally acts of disrespect toward this very worth and dignity. How-
ever, it is routinely the case that persons are treated differently in
different contexts, such that to treat them the same in all con-
texts might well result in patent acts of disrespect. Nor is it at all
clearjust how punishing the offender "rectifies" the results of the
offense. If "rectify" means to set aright, it is lamentably the case
that the consequences of many criminal acts are irremediable.
Harm has been done, the crime committed, and the past cannot
be undone. The life or limb taken cannot be restored; often the
property cannot be recovered. To speak, then, of punishment as
14. Geoffrey Cupit, for example, treats injustices as modes of treating per-
sons as less than they are and establishes a linkage between the implicit (or
explicit) disrespect to a deserts scheme of punishment. See GEOFFREY CUPIT,
JUSTICE AS FITrINGNESS (1996).
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a way of setting things aright is to say more than the words con-
vey, for it is obvious that what has been done cannot be undone.
Moreover, although the notion of human dignity and moral
worth is profound, and profoundly consequential in testing the
rationale on which legislative and juridical practices are based, it
is doubtful that practical and defensible remedies can be pegged
to something as protean as "human dignity." The same may be
said of Philip Pettit's theory of crime as that which violates "the
republican ideal of freedom as nondomination." 5 Pettit charges
the criminal with violating the ideal by subjecting the victim to
domination, thereby restricting the range of undominated
choices and engendering fear in still others who are comparably
vulnerable. 6 Again, however, it is not at all clear that such an
understanding of the wrongfulness of offenses can be translated
into a rational metric of earned punishment. Many instances of
offenses in the legal sense do not match up with domination
(e.g., contractual violations, perjury to shield a guilty loved one),
and many patently offensive actions do not rise to the level of a
punishable action (e.g., a domineering parent). Moreover, by
accepting that every offense somehow violates "the ideal of
nondomination," one may even be at a loss to distinguish law
itself from domination. Briefly put, there is something about
unlawful offenses not captured by the notions of disrespect and
domination. At the level of common sense, the actions that are
punishable are those that result in the loss of or damage to that
which a reasonable person values. Granting this much, and
accepting the classification of offenses now widely adopted, the
core question of punitive authority persists. Specifically, what is
the basis on which the State comes to have this authority?
One answer arises from the retributivist theory of punish-
ment. On this account, the costs exacted by the offense call for
measures intended to restore the balance. The biblical guide
here is "an eye for an eye," but this fails to convey the philosophi-
cal arguments developed in defense of retribution. Richard
Swinburne presents an especially compelling version which
includes, as well, a specification of what is to be counted in deter-
mining what the violator owes to the victim.' 7 Punishment
should take into account the time and effort involved in discover-
ing the guilty party, the emotional costs in anxiety associated with
15. Philip Pettit, Republican Theory and Criminal Punishment, 9 UTILITAS 59,
59 (1997).
16. Id. at 61.
17. See RicHARD SWINBURNE, RESPONSIBILITY AND ATONEMENT 93-109
(1989).
PUNISHMENT, FORGIVEJESS, AND THE PROXY PROBLEM
these efforts, and the actual losses to the victim."8 The ensemble
of factors is then the base for reasonable judgments as to repara-
tions. On this account, the punishment exacted now constitutes
or in some way includes the required reparation.' 9
Swinburne rejects the customary distinction between
revenge and punishment, at least as that distinction is generally
explained, arguing that the State's imposition of punishment
makes sense only to the extent that the State in this is serving as
proxy for the victim.2" As he says:
If you suppose that the state has a right to punish which
has nothing to do with its acting as an agent for the victim,
it becomes impossible to provide any satisfactory retribu-
tionistjustification of punishment. [For] what else can jus-
tify the state effecting retribution? What gives it that
right?21
This is a traditional and a compelling argument for the
State's punitive authority. It sets a limit on the conditions that
permit punishment: minimally, there must be an offense, and
this entails a victim. 22 It also seeks to honor the requirement of
proportionality by ordering punishments to the judged magni-
tude of the pain or loss suffered by the victim.
If it is sound to equate punishment with revenge, however,
and if both are to be understood as retributive demands for repa-
ration, it should make no difference who exacts the punishment.
That is, if it is incumbent on the State to justify its claim to puni-
tive authority, and if the only justification is its serving as a proxy
for the offended, there would seem to be only two plausible argu-
ments leading to this result: one drawn from contractarian politi-
cal theory which finds persons investing in the State such rights
as they have in the state of nature; the other developed as a prin-
cipled defense of retribution for wrongs done to those for whom
the State claims proxy powers. The first of these accounts is
insufficient unto the present purposes for it fails to establish that,
in the state of nature, there is something called a right to avenge
injuries and losses in the first place. The lex talionis describes
practices under a maxim that cannot stand as its own
justification.
If the State's punitive authority is but a proxy power, one
may ask how that power was acquired. If it was "granted" via
18. Id. at 93.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 94.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 102.
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some form of social contract, it must be a power that could have
been bestowed on or even claimed by other entities. Thus, if it
mandated that wrongs be punished, there is no obvious basis on
which to reserve the power of punishment to the State or, for
that matter, to the injured party. Theorists following Locke's ver-
sion of the social contract will grant the actual victim of offenses
the highest standing in the order of potential avengers. Locke
wrote famously that a "state of nature" exists in which each per-
son has the right to recover from the offending party "so much as
may make satisfaction for the harm . . . ."2 However, this mythi-
cal state gives the theorist rather too much room for invention.
Terms such as satisfaction and harm-not to mention "so
much"-leave utterly unanswered a number of significant ques-
tions about punishment as a moral (as opposed to a psychological)
mode of redress.
Beings in the alleged natural state are, presumably, pos-
sessed of social and moral resources still unrefined by the rule of
law and by the discipline that rule applies to civic life. What,
then, supports Locke's all too calm conclusion that, in that state,
aggrieved parties-exacting just so much by way of punishment as
to give themselves satisfaction-will do anything approximating
what is achieved through the rule of law? Will they fashion rules
of evidence? Will they consider mitigating circumstances? Will
they assign an objective value to the stolen property? Will they
permit appeals and the examination of witnesses? Will they test
their own sensibilities to determine whether perhaps they have
felt too deeply a loss that others would regard as trivial?
Presumably, what gives the State the right is just that institu-
tionalization of rational deliberation that is the rule of law itself,
and that preserves the rights of states even in the face of opposi-
tion by a majority of those living within their jurisdiction. To
punish a wrongdoer may, in fact, function as a sort of proxy-
revenge but this cannot be the State's aim, except in the rare
instance in which the victim would seek only what is right, where
the victim would estimate harm rather than my harm; where the
satisfaction sought is not personal but principled. Law as an ordi-
nance of reason, an ordinance of reason promulgated by those
entrusted with securing the common good, is not the proxy-
expression of various human passions, ephemeral desires, often
quirky claims and sensitivities. It replaces the populace as it is
likely to be found at any given time with the ideals persons can
rationally comprehend under favoring conditions. It then stands
23. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE ON CVIL GOVERNMENT 11-12
(Prometheus Books 1986) (1690).
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as the proxy for their morally best selves, which, in the nature of
things, may not be their usual and often self-indulgent selves.
III.
The answer to the question, By what right does the state punish,
if not as an agent of the offended party?, is, By the very source of all
"rights," including those the offended party might have to deserve
or expect reparations. The right and power of punishment are
reserved therefore to the law, not to the offended.24 This is
Kant's position on the matter, and it requires some
amplification.
For Kant, freedom and morality are often so mutually entail-
ing as to render each incomplete as a concept until the other is
incorporated.25 Owing to this, Kant's political and legislative ide-
als accord absolute value to freedom and are incompatible with
alternative ideals in which the value of freedom is merely instru-
mental. It is the First Critique that expresses the standard with
uncompromising economy:
A constitution allowing the greatest possible human freedom in
accordance with the laws by which the freedom of each is made
to be consistent with that of all others-I do not speak of the
greatest happiness, for this will follow of itself-is at any
rate a necessary idea, which must be taken as fundamental
not only in first projecting a constitution but in all its
laws. 26
This paragraph-length sentence contains four distinct ele-
ments, each illuminating vast areas of the Kantian project. It is
only under conditions of freedom that choice is possible; only
when free that one can be responsible in the moral sense of the
term. The fullest moral life, then, presupposes the agent's free
investment of his life in the ideals of morality. The first element
is the conceptual and necessary relationship between freedom
and the very possibility of morality.
If, however, there is to be a social world at all, the preserva-
tion of freedom requires laws, some constitutive structure of soci-
ety capable of securing freedom. Inevitably, laws constrain and
limit freedom, thereby presenting a threat to morality itself.
Those who are compelled to honor a moral maxim are merely
behaving properly but cannot be said to be living a moral life.
24. IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON 312 (Norman Kemp
Smith trans., St. Martin's Press 1965) (1781) [hereinafter KANT, CRITIQUE OF
PURE REASON].
25. Id.
26. Id. at 312.
2004]
382 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 18
How, therefore, should the task or aim of law be understood?
This is the second element: The task or aim of law is to make the
freedom of each consistent with the freedom of all. An exercise
of freedom that imperils the freedom of others is one that
reduces their moral standing which is the significant respect in
which unlawful conduct may be regarded generically as a form of
disrespect or contempt. The law itself is contemptuous of those
living under it when its aims are indifferent to freedom. Such a
regime loses the right-it abandons the conceptual tools-by
which to expect allegiance or fidelity as a moral obligation. No
one can be morally required to support a rule of law that renders
morality itself jejune.
Hence, the third element, which insists on the necessity of the
relationship between the very concept of law and the maximiza-
tion of freedom. Obedience to the law is either the outcome of
fear and coercion or the expression of fidelity to principle by a
rational being possessed of an autonomous will. Obedience
secured by force and threats of force is compulsory, leaving its
subject beyond the perimeter of moral space. It connects all con-
duct to one or another hypothetical imperative (e.g., the impera-
tive to avoid or reduce one's pain or suffering), and thus
detaches the lived life from that categorical imperative by which
one gains full citizenship in the moral world. Finally, as the
fourth element, the greatest happiness available to a rational being
is the fullest expression of that rationality in framing a authentic
form and course of life. There can be no fundamental conflict
between the happiness worthy of such a being and that rule of
law which has as its determinative objective securing the freedom of
each in a manner that is consistent with that of all others.
Those who are fit for the rule of law understand this, for it is
a foundational assumption. One could not at once comprehend
the concept of what is "forbidden," except by recognizing that
there are some actions that one can choose but must not. To
comprehend this much is already to know oneself to be autono-
mous and to know the same about kindred beings. It is to under-
stand, therefore, that the manner in which justifies a course of
action is by the application of a principle; one that supplies a
reason for action not confined to this or that action, but covering
all actions of a certain kind; e.g., destructive actions, cooperative
actions, or affectionate actions. The maxim of the action is not
simply a rationale for doing something here and now, but ajusti-
fication for acting in a certain way in a wide range of situations.
The question then arises as to whether there is a single maxim
capable of directing all actions under all conditions in every situ-
ation. If there is, then it is categorical. It is a categorical imperative.
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"Act as if the maxim of your action were to become through your will a
universal law of nature. "27
That Kant's version of retributivism could be construed as
inconsistent with such high blown purposes has been noted often
enough. Kant's arguments for punishment, however, are based
chiefly neither on fear nor utility. The threat of punishment
motivates the actor to understand the importance of due deliber-
ation and also is a useful way of controlling one set of hypotheti-
cal imperatives with another. Punishment under the forms of
law is also a form of embarrassment; a loss of standing and
respect that reaches the moral core of the person in ways that
physical pain and duress do not.
28
There is, however, another form of pain, uniquely inflicted
when attached to a significant moral failing. Punishment that is
'just" aims to inflict pain aroused by the knowledge that one has
been the cause of pain to others. Operating on those with the
capacity for guilt and remorse, such punishment is a form of
cleansing In this respect, retributivist theories of punishment are
not unlike more ancient conceptions of crimes as requiring a
purification. In addition to these functions, punishment secures
the trust of persons in the law, thereby validating further the
proxy power which just laws have by right. This is not merely the
subjective feeling of confidence but an objective trust established
by the predictability of retributive punishments.2 9
It is not beyond the pale of reason or, indeed, of actual cases
to expect the offender, as a member of the community of
rational and moral beings, not only to feel guilt and strive to
atone but to wish for such purifying punishment. The Kantian
theory requires of moral beings a desire forjustice.3 ° There is no
bar to this desire being reflexive. If one requires that offenders
be punished, then one must require the same of oneself. Gary
Herbert expresses the Kantian position this way: "[T] he person
who asserts the right of humanity in his own person acknowl-
edges his freedom, his humanity, his rights, his capacity to obli-
gate others, and, coincidentally, but not unimportantly, the
27. IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MoRALs 89
(HJ. Paton trans., Harper & Row 1964) (1785).
28. See Thomas E. Hill, Jr., Punishment, Conscience, and Moral Worth, 36 S.J.
PHIL. 51 (1997) (containing an excellent discussion of this aspect of Kantian
theory).
29. See Susan Dimock, Retributivisim and Trust, 16 LAW & PHIL. 37 (1997)
(discussing insightfully the objective trust established by the predictability of
retributive punishments). However, I do not accept her claim that the "pur-
pose of law" is to maintain basic trust of this kind. See id. at 39.
30. KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REAsON, supra note 24, at 313.
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legitimacy of his punishment when he fails to act according to
the law."31
Retribution thus understood reconstructs not only what the
moral offense has destroyed or disfigured in others, but in one-
self. This same understanding illuminates the deficiencies ofpurely utilitarian or consequentialist theories of punishment. To
punish in order to deter others, or to give vent to the same pas-
sions that impelled the offense, strips the offender of the right to
be punished-the right to an earned desert.
In After Virtue, Alasdair MacIntyre notes the movement from
an Aristotelian to a Nietzschean world view.32 The bureaucratiza-
tion of moral and social problems leads to solutions based on
"suppressed Nietzschean premises"33 that are indifferent to or by
now ignorant of the radically different premises that grounded
Aristotle's conception of politics and morality. In the end, a
political regime is either justified or is a tyranny. Justification is a
matter of rationality and principle, as regimes are a matter oflaws and obligations. What it is in law that would obligate is not
the threat of punishment; not even the endorsement of majori-
ties.34 It is, instead, the rational contact it makes with the citi-
zen's own rational powers and rationally framed ends and
purposes.
IV.
By what right does the state punish in my behaf?.
By what right does the state forgive in my behal.
These are conceptually symmetrical questions. Having
addressed the first in the previous section, the second calls for
less attention. The most direct answer to these questions is that
the state's rights are a feature of statehood itself. Indeed, absent
statehood or some recognizable and settled form of essentially
civic or political life, the very concept of a "right" must be vanish-
ingly thin. Nevertheless, the political or civic protections that
come to stand as "rights" must match up with something real and
actual. If there is ontological weight to rights as such, it is con-
ferred not by the powers of those who claim or take them, but by
31. Gary B. Herbert, Immanuel Kant: Punishment and the Political Precondi-
tions of Moral Existence, 23 INTERPRETATION 61, 66 (1995).
32. ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 109-20 (1981).
33. Id. at 114.
34. See generally ROBERT P. GEORGE, MAKING MEN MORAL (1993) (assessing
the limited authority enjoyed by majorities as majorities). George considers
Lord Devlin's famous contention that, as the function of law is to preserve
social cohesion, the law may be fashioned to endorse or forbid whatever threat-
ens that cohesion and needs no justification beyond that. Id. at 71-82.
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the vulnerabilities of those who might be victimized by just these
powers. To have a "right" in this sense is to be vulnerable in a
manner that is subject to respect and protection.3" In the
enlarged sense of vulnerabilities, the offenses calling for punish-
ment and moral disapproval are those that exploit or enlarge cer-
tain of the vulnerabilities. The phrase used to describe offenses
of this sort is that they violate the rights of the victim.36
As vulnerabilities are generative of rights, it is powers that
are generative of duties. The misapplication of one's powers in
such a way as to infringe the rights of others is what constitutes
offenses warranting punishment and moral censure. Moral cen-
sure, however-and in a manner not unlike what Bentham had
in mind-is or should be a source of pain and distress. It is a
punishment and therefore must be proportionate to be just.
Once the offender has been punished enough, the resulting dis-
position is that of forgiveness. Forgiveness is the expressed or
implicit judgment that the price paid by the offender is propor-
tionate within the power of reason to discern. Whatever emotion
might accompany the judgment adds or subtracts from the qual-
ity of mercy or compassion by which justice refines and perfects
itself. If it is the aim ofjustice to achieve good, to want for others
what is in their best interest (as the ideal friend would want for
the other) then the attainment of justice should be the occasion
of joy.
In its laws, punishments and pardons, the state is the embod-
iment of what is best in those who form and sustain it. In its
institutional projection it has little means by which to have or
express sentiments. Rather, by customary attention to human
frailty, by an official disposition toward clemency and away from
lustful vengeance, the state is able to administer a form of justice
that has the look and the spirit of friendship. It was Aristotle's
understanding that the ideal polis is a community of friends, but
with friendship itself understood in ineliminably moral terms. As
he says in his ethical treatise, "Friendship and justice seem to be
concerned with the same things and to be found in the same
people. For there seems to be some kind ofjustice in every com-
munity, and some kind of friendship as well."
37
35. See Rom Harre & Daniel N. Robinson, On the Primacy of Duties, 70
PHIL. 513 (1995).
36. Current developments in the so-called "restorative justice" are illustra-
tive. See, e.g., JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND RESPONSIVE REGULA-
TION (2002).
37. ARisroL, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 218 (Sarah Broadie & Christopher
Rowe trans., Oxford Press 2002).
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Although this may all succeed as an adequate defense of the
state's punitive authority, it is still not sufficient to explain andjustify proxy-forgiveness extended by those who were not the vic-
tims of the offending action. The deceased has left behind a wife
and infant child. The question is whether, if, and how the widow
can forgive the assailant. In whose name is the forgiveness
extended? Is the spouse a proxy in such matters? Can she for-
give also in behalf of the now fatherless infant who will go
through life with only one parent? Might it be said that she has
the power to confer quasi-but not full-forgiveness?"8
Properly understood, no one forgives "by proxy," though
one may have compassion for both the victim and the offender,
even in equal amounts. One forgives by judgment, and it is in this
sense that the state stands as the rational judge of the extent, in
time and in severity, of punishment sufficient to warrant forgive-
ness. The judgment that, all relevant factors considered, the
punishment of moral censure-the punishment of reduced
moral standing-has run its course, the time now having arrived
when the offender is to be restored, returned to the human fam-
ily, better prepared now to take up the life of citizen, if not saint.
38. See, e.g., Piers Benn, Forgiveness and Loyalty, 71 PHIL. 369 (1996) (con-
cluding that a proxy can confer quasi, but not full, forgiveness).
